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In-Q-Tel: The Central Intelligence 
Agency as Venture Capitalist 
By John T. Reinert* 
Abstract: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States’ principal 
foreign intelligence and spy organization, chartered the first government-
sponsored venture capital firm, dubbed In-Q-Tel, in February 1999.  In-Q-Tel 
represents the twenty-first century fusion of U.S. spy efforts with the venture 
capital industry.  Envisioned as a platform to expand the research and 
development (R&D) efforts of the CIA into the private sector, In-Q-Tel uses 
CIA-supplied funds to make strategic investments in startup companies 
developing commercially focused technologies that are of interest to the CIA 
and greater intelligence community.  This Comment contends that, although 
R&D collaboration between the public and private sectors is vital and should be 
encouraged, such collaboration should not be in the form of a venture capital 
firm chartered and sponsored by the CIA.  The CIA is not equipped to succeed in 
the notoriously perilous business of venture capital, and heightened ethical 
concerns surround the making of government-sponsored equity investments in 
private companies.  Indeed, In-Q-Tel often invests in companies with 
international operations, vicariously and unnecessarily exposing the CIA and 
larger U.S. government to foreign entanglements.  This Comment begins by 
tracing relevant developments in the funding of U.S. spy efforts in Part II.  Next, 
Part III explores the venture capital industry, paying particular attention to the 
interplay between venture capital and R&D.  Part IV then analyzes the 
relationship between the CIA and In-Q-Tel.  Finally, Part V: (1) contends the 
risks of In-Q-Tel currently outweigh its benefits; (2) suggests the current In-Q-
Tel model inappropriately exposes the CIA and larger U.S. government to 
disputes arising from private international law; and (3) proposes alternative 
courses of action by which the CIA may tap into the R&D efforts of the private 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States’ principal 
foreign intelligence and spy organization, chartered the first government-
sponsored venture capital firm, dubbed In-Q-Tel, in February 1999.
1
  
Envisioned as a platform to expand the research and development (R&D) 
efforts of the CIA into the private sector, In-Q-Tel’s mission is “to identify, 
adapt, and deliver innovative technology solutions to support the missions 
of the Central Intelligence Agency and broader U.S. Intelligence 
Community.”2 
Under the In-Q-Tel model, the CIA provides investment capital and 
 
 1  BUS. EXEC. FOR NAT’L SEC., ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTELLIGENCE: THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN-Q-TEL VENTURE 6 (C. Lawrence Meador et al. eds., 
2001), available at http://www.iqt.org/attachments/BENS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter BENS 
REPORT]. 
 2  IQT Corporate Fact Sheet, IN-Q-TEL, 





identifies “pressing problems.”3  Tasked with finding solutions to these 
unclassified problems,
4
 In-Q-Tel turns to the private sector and makes 
“strategic . . . investments in startup companies that have developed 
commercially focused technologies that will provide strong, near-term 
advantages (within 36 months) to the [intelligence community’s] mission.”5  




Within a few years of In-Q-Tel’s formation, other government entities 
also looking to bridge the gap between the R&D efforts of the public and 
private sectors followed the CIA’s lead and set up similar ventures to invest 
in unclassified commercial technology.  For instance, the Army chartered 
OnPoint Technologies to “back technology designed to produce lighter-
weight and longer-lasting energy sources for soldiers.”7  According to the 
Army’s chief scientist, A. Michael Andrews, “[f]inding new energy sources 
for soldiers is akin to a search for better power solutions for handheld 
computers like Palm Pilots, BlackBerries, personal digital assistants and 
cell phones.  Lighter and smaller is better.”8  Not long after the founding of 
OnPoint Technologies, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) chartered Red Planet Capital—a name that reflects NASA’s long-
term goal of sending astronauts to Mars—to invest in emerging 
technologies “that NASA might be able to use” in the future.9  NASA’s 
manager for the project, Lisa L. Lockyer, explained: “NASA could see that 
a lot of technical innovation is coming out of companies that don’t 
traditionally do business with the government, and we wanted better and 
 
 3  GEORGE TENET WITH BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE 
CIA 26 (2007). 
 4  BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. 
 5  IQT Mission, IN-Q-TEL, http://www.iqt.org/about/mission.html (last visited Feb. 4, 
2013). 
 6  As one commentator noted, In-Q-Tel:  
[C]an make either an equity investment, where it receives part ownership in the 
company, or a work program investment.  Work programs typically provide 
funding for a company to develop its technology in a way that suits [Intelligence 
Community] needs.  For example, if a company has developed a new 
communications antenna, but the CIA needs that antenna to be 50 percent smaller, 
it could make a work program investment to help fund that reduction in size.  
Typically, In-Q-Tel makes both equity and work program investments.   
Andrew S. Mara, Maximizing the Returns of Government Venture Capital Programs, DEF. 
HORIZONS (Nat’l Def. Univ./Inst. for Nat’l Strategic Studies, D.C.), no. 71, Jan.2011, at 2, 
available at http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DH%2071.pdf. 
 7  Deals & Deal Makers—Memo to Techies: This Army Wants Your Energy Ideas, WALL 
ST. J., May 9, 2003, at C5. 
 8  Id. 
 9  Marc Kaufman, NASA Invests in Its Future with Venture Capital Firm, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 31, 2006, at A19. 
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faster access to that creativity.”10  Even the U.S. Postal Service, faced with a 
projected loss of $7 billion for fiscal year 2010, expressed interest in the In-
Q-Tel model.
11
  Commenting on the projected loss, Louis Atkins, executive 
vice president of the National Association of Postal Supervisors, declared 
the Postal Service “lacks the vision, resources and know-how [to] generate 
additional revenue in innovative ways.”12  His solution: “The Postal Service 
needs its own In-Q-Tel to achieve the same leverage that connects 
technology advances to improvements in communications, including going 
beyond hard-copy mail itself.”13 
Although collaboration between the R&D efforts of the public and 
private sectors is vital and should be encouraged, this Comment contends 
that such collaboration should not be in the form of a venture capital firm 
chartered and sponsored by the CIA.  The CIA is not equipped to succeed in 
the notoriously perilous business of venture capital, and heightened ethical 
concerns surround the making of government-sponsored equity investments 
in private companies.  Indeed, In-Q-Tel often invests in companies with 
international operations, vicariously and unnecessarily exposing the CIA 
and larger U.S. government to foreign entanglements. 
This Comment traces relevant developments in the funding of U.S. spy 
efforts in Part II.  Next, Part III explores the venture capital industry, paying 
particular attention to the interplay between venture capital and R&D.  Part 
IV then analyzes the relationship between the CIA and In-Q-Tel.  Finally, 
Part V: (1) argues the risks of In-Q-Tel currently outweigh the benefits; (2) 
suggests the current In-Q-Tel model inappropriately exposes the CIA and 
larger U.S. government to disputes arising from private international law; 
and (3) proposes alternative courses of action by which the CIA may tap 
into the R&D efforts of the private sector.  Part VI concludes this 
Comment. 
II.  FUNDING U.S. SPY EFFORTS: THE ORIGINS OF IN-Q-TEL 
While the concept of a CIA-sponsored venture capital firm may seem 
odd, such an initiative derives from the exceptionally broad discretion 
granted to the U.S. intelligence community regarding the use of funds since 
1775.  This Part accordingly provides an historical context by which In-Q-
Tel may be examined. 
 
 10  Id. 
 11  Joe Davidson, Postal Service Desperate for Good Ideas, WASH. POST, June 23, 2010, 
at B03. 
 12  Id. 




A.  Early History: 1775–1947 
The historical context surrounding In-Q-Tel’s development traces back 
to November 29, 1775.  In the midst of the Revolutionary War, the Second 
Continental Congress created the Committee of Secret Correspondence “for 
the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland, 
and other parts of the world.”14  Recognizing such a group would require 
funding as well as the discretionary authority to expend funds as it deemed 
fit, Congress resolved “to defray all such expenses as may arise by carrying 
on such correspondence, and for the payment of such agents as they may 
send on this service.”15  Called “the distant ancestor of today’s CIA”16 by 
one historian, the Committee, chaired by Benjamin Franklin,
17
 carried out 
various foreign intelligence missions as assigned by Congress.  On May 18, 
1776, for example, Congress directed the Committee “to endeavour to 
discover the designs of the French in assembling so large a fleet, with so 
great a number of troops, in the West Indies, and whether they mean to act 
for or against America.”18 
The members of the Committee of Secret Correspondence were not the 
only spies serving the revolutionary cause.  Indeed, George Washington 
employed “an elaborate network of spies in the colonies.”19  But the 
Committee is remarkable in that it was given exceptionally broad 
discretionary authority to expend funds with little or no reporting to 
Congress.
20
  This may seem an unusual grant of power in the context of the 
founding of a democratic, pluralistic republic.  However, as Ben Franklin 
and other members of the Committee put it: “We find, by fatal experience, 
the Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets.”21  Almost two 
 
 14 2 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS, FROM THE FIRST 
MEETING THEREOF TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONFEDERATION, BY THE ADOPTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (Thomas B. Wait 1820) [hereinafter SECRET 
JOURNALS]. 
 15  Id. at 5. 
 16  CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND 
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 7 (1995). 
 17  Denys P. Myers, Legislatures and Foreign Relations, 11 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 643, 676 
(1917). 
 18  SECRET JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 6. 
 19  Robert M. Gates, Intelligence, Democracy, and Freedom, 22 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
231, 231 (1992). 
 20  See, e.g., Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“The Committee exercised broad discretionary power to conduct intelligence activities 
independent of the Continental Congress and to safeguard the secrecy of matters pertaining 
to its agents, though Congress asserted greater direct control following the Declaration of 
Independence. It is especially remarkable that the Committee was in a position to insist upon 
secrecy even against Congress, which functioned both as the legislative and the executive 
power at this time and exercised control over foreign affairs.”). 
 21  AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE 
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centuries later, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would grant 
similar deference to the CIA.
22
 
George Washington’s contributions to the development and funding of 
U.S. spy efforts did not end with the Revolutionary War.  On January 8, 
1790, during a speech to Congress that would be remembered as the first 
State of the Union address,
23
 President Washington requested “a competent 
fund designated for defraying the expenses incident to the conduct of our 
foreign affairs.”24  On July 1, 1790, Congress responded by creating the 
Contingent Fund of Foreign Intercourse, known informally as the Secret 
Service Fund.
25
  Congress authorized the President “to draw from the 
treasury of the United States . . . a sum not exceeding forty thousand dollars 
annually” to finance intelligence operations.26  The Act included an annual 
reporting provision, but Congress required the President to account only for 
expenditures from the fund “as in his judgment may be made public.”27  On 
February 9, 1793, Congress clarified the reporting provision by requiring 
the President to certify expenditures from the fund.  Significantly, Congress 
declared “every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the 
sums or sums therein expressed to have been expended.”28  Thus, while 
President Washington had to certify the sums spent from the fund, he could 
“conceal both the purposes and recipients of payments.”29 
Although the Contingent Fund remained in use by U.S. Presidents 
until the mid-twentieth century,
30
 the operations it funded consisted of “ad 
hoc efforts.”31  This would change during World War II,32 when President 
 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIRST TO THE SECOND 
SESSION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS 568 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834). 
 22  Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, ch. 227, 68 Stat. 208 (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2006)). 
 23  See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 20 at 158 (describing President Washington’s address 
as “the precursor to the ‘State of the Union’ message. . .”). 
 24  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 969–70 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 25  ANDREW, supra note 16, at 11. 
 26  Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22, § 1, 1790 FIRST CONG. 128-29 (providing the means of 
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations). 
 27  Id. 
 28  Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, § 2, 1793 SECOND CONG. 299–30 (continuing “in force for a 
limited time,” and amending “An act providing the means of intercourse between the United 
States and foreign nations”). 
 29  ANDREW, supra note 16, at 11. 
 30  See, e.g., Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 158–59 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (“The contingent fund remained in continuous use by the President throughout the 
nineteenth century and up to the creation of the CIA in the mid-twentieth century.”). 
 31  Gates, supra note 19, at 232. 
 32  See Edward F. Sayle, The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, 1 J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 (1986) (discussing the 




Franklin D. Roosevelt created the United States’ first centralized 
intelligence agency—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—in order to 
coordinate wartime intelligence efforts.
33
 
Roosevelt named William J. Donovan to lead the OSS.  An influential 
New York lawyer
34
 and a recipient of the Medal of Honor,
35
 Donovan 
would become known as the “founder of modern American intelligence”36 
for his innovative approach to OSS operations.  Instead of building OSS 
manpower solely with military staff, Donovan recruited gifted civilians 
with seemingly unrelated talents.  Robert M. Gates, who led the CIA from 
1991 to 1993, commented: “Donovan’s greatest legacy to American 
intelligence was that he brought talented people from all walks of life into 
the national security business: people like prominent Harvard historian 
William Langer, jazz musician Miles Copeland, filmmaker John Ford, 
baseball player Mo Berg, and future chef Julia Child.”37  Fifty years after 
the OSS turned to talented civilians for assistance with its wartime mission, 
the CIA would take Donovan’s approach one step further with In-Q-Tel.  
While Donovan had recruited civilians to join the OSS, In-Q-Tel would 
invest CIA money in technology-focused private-sector startups. 
As World War II drew to a close, uncertainty surrounded the future of 
U.S. intelligence efforts.  In September 1945, shortly after the ending of 
hostilities with Japan, President Harry S. Truman shut down the OSS and 
effectively cut off funding for intelligence operations.
38
  “Americans had 
believed that their country was guided by uniquely high ethical principles,” 
wrote historian Christopher Andrew in 1995.
39
  “They regarded peacetime 
espionage, if they thought of it at all, as a corrupt outgrowth of Old War 
diplomacy, alien to the open and upright American way.”40  The Cold War, 
however, would finally “persuade them otherwise.”41 
The charismatic Donovan sought to be a driving force in that 
 
 33  Jennifer Davis Heaps, Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic 
Services, 61 AM. ARCHIVIST 287, 289 (1998). 
 34  A Look Back: Gen. William J. Donovan Heads Office of Strategic Services, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/gen.-
william-j.-donovan-heads-oss.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
 35  See William J. Donovan, A Plea for State Regulation, 159 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 76, 83 (1932) (“William J. Donovan . . . was the only man in the World War who 
received every decoration in the power of the United States to give: the Congressional Medal 
of Honor, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Distinguished Service Cross.”). 
 36  Gates, supra note 19, at 232. 
 37  Id. at 233. 
 38  ANDREW, supra note 16, at 160. 
 39  Id. at 29. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
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persuasion, but he faced resistance from President Truman.
42
  
Consequently, Donovan took his campaign directly to the public.  Speaking 
to the Bar Association of New York City in February 1947, Donovan 
advocated for the permanent establishment and funding of coordinated 
intelligence efforts.  The work of an intelligence agency, he explained, is 
not “mysterious” or “sinister”—it simply entails “pulling together myriad 
facts, making a pattern of them, and drawing inferences from that 
pattern.”43  After addressing his audience’s fears of a peacetime intelligence 
agency, Donovan argued the United States “should have a Central 
Intelligence Agency, headed by a civilian with no allegiance to any 
governmental department, to collate and coordinate all of the information 
received in this country.”44  A few months later, with the hostilities of the 
Cold War beginning “in earnest,”45 Donovan won the debate. 
B.  Formation of the CIA and In-Q-Tel: 1947–1999 
The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA “[f]or the purpose 
of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government 
departments and agencies in the interest of national security.”46  The newly 
formed CIA drew many of its first officers from the ranks of the former 
OSS.
47
  Two years later, with the CIA formally established and staffed, the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 further clarified issues related to 
the CIA’s administration.48 
While the Central Intelligence Agency Act addressed the future of a 
new government agency, it reflected the prior development of American 
spy efforts.  Echoing the broad grant of discretionary power made by the 
Second Continental Congress to Ben Franklin and the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence, the Act grants the CIA the expansive authority to expend 
funds “for purposes necessary to carry out [the CIA’s] functions.”49  And 
the reporting requirements of the Act mirror the language used by Congress 
at the end of the eighteenth century.  Just as Congress in 1793 had required 
a simple “certificate”50 of the sums spent from the Contingent Fund with no 
 
 42  See, e.g., ANDREW, supra note 16, at 156–61; see also AGOSTINO VON HASSELL & 
SIGRID MACRAE, ALLIANCE OF ENEMIES: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE SECRET AMERICAN AND 
GERMAN COLLABORATION TO END WORLD WAR II 292–95 (2006). 
 43  U.S. Intelligence Held Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1947, at 6. 
 44  Id. 
 45  ANDREW, supra note 16, at 168. 
 46  National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 102(d), 61 Stat. 496, 498 (current version at 
50 U.S.C. § 403-4(b) (2006)). 
 47  See Gates, supra note 19, at 233. 
 48  Cent. Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, ch. 227, § 8(a), 68 Stat. 208, 212 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403(j) (2006)). 
 49  Id. 




need for an explanation of the purposes or recipients, the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 required the same for the CIA’s 
expenditures.
51
  Both acts even conclude with the same sentence: “[E]very 
such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher.”52  Thus, with the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act, Congress “merely continued a 
longstanding practice of secret expenditures for foreign intelligence 
matters.”53 
Although the CIA of the Cold War era derived from its predecessor of 
the Revolutionary War era, it also broke new ground—especially with 
respect to the role of R&D.  The CIA began to view R&D and the 
technology it produced as a significant contributor to CIA’s overall mission.  
The U-2 reconnaissance plane, the SR-71 reconnaissance plane, and the 
Corona spy satellite program emerged from this new focus on funding 
cutting-edge R&D programs.
54
  Indeed, in recognition of their technological 
feats during the Cold War, the members of the CIA’s Directorate of Science 
and Technology earned the nickname the “Wizards of Langley”55—a 
reference to the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia. 
But the end of the Cold War would challenge the need for the CIA’s 
continued existence,
56
 not to mention the funding of its expensive R&D 
programs.
57
  Indeed, when he began his tenure as Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI)
58
 in July 1997, George Tenet took the helm of a CIA that 
faced an identity crisis.  The Cold War no longer served as the justification 
for the CIA’s mission and massive budget.  “During the 1990s,” recalled 
Tenet in 2007, “the conventional wisdom was that we had won the cold war 
and it was time to reap the peace dividend.”59  As a result, the federal 
government slashed the CIA’s budget and workforce.60  In Tenet’s view, 
 
 51  50 U.S.C. § 403(j)(b). 
 52  Id.; Act of Feb. 9, 1793 § 2. 
 53  Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 54  See Rick E. Yannuzzi, In-Q-Tel: A New Partnership between the CIA and the Private 
Sector, 9 DEF. INTELLIGENCE J. 25, 26 (2000). 
 55  See generally JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE WIZARDS OF LANGLEY: INSIDE THE CIA’S 
DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2001). 
 56  Gates, supra note 19, at 234 (“[A] handful of voices question[ed] the need for 
intelligence in a post-Soviet, post-Cold War world . . . .”). 
 57  TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 25–26. 
 58  George John Tenet, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-
for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/directors-and-deputy-
directors-of-central-intelligence/tenet.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).  In a 2004 
restructuring of the intelligence community, the position of Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) replaced the position of DCI.  History of the CIA, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-the-cia/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
 59  TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 14. 
 60  Id.  As Tenet recalled: “The entire intelligence community, not just CIA, lost billions 
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“the supposed ‘peace dividend’ was devastating to the spy business at a 
time when its vitality was most needed.”61  As a result, morale at the CIA 
was low.  Worse, as the fifth DCI in only seven years, Tenet realized the 
CIA faced the “critical problem” of “episodic leadership.”62 
The state of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology had also 
deteriorated, as the rise of the internet age challenged the CIA’s 
preeminence in the area of R&D.  “As limited as our human resources were 
when I took over as DCI in 1997,” wrote Tenet, “our technological capacity 
might have been even worse.”63  As he put it, the CIA had once been a 
“giant” in the area of science and technology, but “the dot-com revolution 
was passing us by.  Private-sector technology was far outstripping our 
ability to keep pace with our targets.”64 
In one of his first moves as DCI, Tenet launched a strategic direction 
study to address these problems and assess how the CIA should approach 
(and fund) twenty-first century operations.
65
  Not surprisingly, “[t]he study 
made a direct link between the Agency’s future technology investments and 
improving its information gathering and analysis capabilities.”66  At that 
time, it had become apparent that technology would play a major role in the 
new landscape faced by the CIA—not the space-age military technology 
developed in secret labs for the Cold War, but information technology (IT) 
and computer systems developed by young entrepreneurs for the 
commercial marketplace.  Writing for Foreign Affairs in 1990, for example, 
one commentator observed that “American intelligence analysts now have 
to cope with a torrent of information and data.  Amid an exponential 
proliferation of satellites and fiber optics, interlinked computers and data 
bases . . . these analysts are becoming information junkies.”67  He 
concluded: “If effectively harnessed and channeled, then astutely exploited, 
this new information and data flood can dramatically improve the quality 
and accuracy of American intelligence assessments and estimates . . . but it 
creates new complexities as fast as it clarifies old mysteries.”68 
The CIA under Tenet faced the serious problem of how to deal with 
these new complexities.  A novel approach suggested by Dr. Ruth David, 
the head of the Directorate of Science and Technology, caught Tenet’s 
 
of dollars in funding.  Our workforce was slashed by almost 25 percent.”  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. at 25–26. 
 64  Id. at 16. 
 65  Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 25. 
 66  Id. 
 67  George A. Carver, Jr., Intelligence in the Age of Glasnost, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 147, 159 
(1990). 






  David proposed that the CIA outsource a portion of its R&D efforts 
to the private sector.
70
  After all, according to one former CIA official, “[a]s 
an information-based agency, the CIA must be at the cutting edge of 
information technology in order to maintain its competitive edge and 
provide its customers with intelligence that is both timely and relevant.”71  
The problem, according to the official, was “the CIA did not, and could not, 
compete for IT innovation and talent with the same speed and agility that 
those in the commercial marketplace, whose businesses are driven by 
‘Internet time’ and profit, could.”72 
After much discussion within the CIA and talks with leaders in the 
private sector,
73
 the concept of a CIA-backed venture capital firm charged 
with “harness[ing] the brilliance of young innovators in the IT industry”74 
came to fruition.  While the concept was new, it fit within the exceptionally 
broad discretion granted to the intelligence community since 1775.
75
 
The CIA approached Norman Augustine, the former chief executive 
officer (CEO) of the aerospace and defense company Lockheed Martin, to 
serve as the firm’s founder, since Augustine had “the experience and 
passion necessary to start the Corporation.”76  Augustine accepted.77  In 
February 1999, the CIA chartered In-Q-Tel
78
 as “a private, independent, 
nonprofit corporation”79 incorporated in Delaware.80  The original corporate 
charter described In-Q-Tel’s mission as follows: “[T]o exploit and develop 
new and emerging information technologies and pursue R&D that produce 
innovative solutions to the most difficult problems facing the CIA and 
Intelligence Community.”81  A month later, In-Q-Tel received its first 
contract from the CIA.
82
  Thus, concluded a former CIA official, “In-Q-Tel 
was in business.”83 
In-Q-Tel represents the twenty-first century fusion of U.S. spy efforts 
with the venture capital industry.  The broad grant of discretionary authority 
 
 69  TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 26. 
 72  Id. at 27. 
 73  Id. at 26. 
 74  TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26. 
 75  BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 31. 
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afforded to the CIA traces directly to the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence.  Today, the Director of the CIA is enabled under a 
statutory catchall provision to “perform such other functions and duties 
related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the 
Director of National Intelligence may direct.”84  The provision mirrors the 
language used by Congress in 1775.  The similarly broad grant of power to 
the CIA to expend funds with little or no reporting requirements traces back 
to George Washington’s “competent fund”—the Contingent Fund of 
Foreign Intercourse.  Today, the CIA’s funds “may be expended without 
regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of 
Government funds.”85  Lastly, the decision by the CIA to approach the 
private sector to tap into civilian ingenuity traces to William Donovan’s 
innovative approach to staffing the OSS.
86
    
Thus, the CIA’s decision to form In-Q-Tel fit within the parameters for 
funding intelligence operations established more than two centuries ago.  
However, In-Q-Tel also brought the CIA into the unchartered territory of 
venture capital—a business model this Comment will now discuss. 
III.  VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
When the Second Continental Congress created the Committee of 
Secret Correspondence in 1775 and thereby paved the way for the CIA, the 
modern venture capital industry did not exist.
87
  The concept of a market for 
equity investments, whereby an investor exchanges capital for an ownership 
stake in a company and is then able to trade that stake with other investors, 
had been around since 1602, when the Dutch East India Company made the 
first initial public offering (IPO) of corporate stock.
88
  But the first real 
venture capital firm did not come to existence until more than three 
centuries later, when a group of investors, led by the president of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a professor at Harvard Business 
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Although the success of ARD’s investments “ranged widely,”90 the firm 
gained notoriety when its initial investment of $70,000 in Digital 
Equipment Company in 1957 ballooned to a reported value of $355 million 
upon the company’s IPO about a decade later.91  From the ARD model 
grew the modern venture capital industry.
92
 
A.  Venture Capital in the United States 
Today, private-sector venture capital fund managers (i.e., venture 
capital firms) serve as “financial intermediaries between sources of funds 
(typically institutional investors) and high-growth and high-tech 
entrepreneurial firms”93 that otherwise have limited access to capital.94  The 
fund managers often play “a significant role in enhancing the value of their 
entrepreneurial investments as they provide financial, administrative, 
marketing, and strategic advice.”95  In order to play such a leading role, 
venture capital fund managers usually take relatively large equity positions 
in their portfolio companies and exert high-level control.
96
  Indeed, 
according to the National Venture Capital Association: “Venture capital 
partners become actively engaged with a company, typically taking a board 
seat.  With a startup, daily interaction with the management team is 
common.”97 
The goal of the venture capital firm is to “grow the company to a point 
where it can go public or be acquired by a larger corporation (called an 
‘exit’) at a price that far exceeds the amount of capital invested.”98  
 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id.; see generally David H. Hsu & Martin Kenney, Organizing Venture Capital: The 
Rise and Demise of American Research & Development Corporation, 1946–1973, 14 INDUS. 
& CORP. CHANGE 579–616 (2005). 
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commercial activity.”  JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE 
CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 1–13 (2012). 
 93  DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY 
CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (2009). 
 94  Typically, banks do not finance entrepreneurial projects, since the risk of default is 
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or family and friends for the capital needed to get the project off the ground.  Venture capital 
funds take on these high-risk projects and provide start-up capital; in return for assuming 
such high risk, these investors expect to be compensated handsomely.  Id. at 10–11. 
 95  Id. at 4. 
 96  Id. at 11. 
 97  NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N & THOMSON REUTERS, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL 
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 2011, at 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/Rachid_Sefrioui/venture-capital-2011-nvca-yearbook-2011. 
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Typically, the investment is held for multiple years before the exit.
99
  For 
their highly specialized services, venture capital fund managers are 
compensated with an annual management fee (generally 2% of the fund’s 
committed capital) plus a performance fee called “carried interest” 
(generally 20% of capital gains from the exit sales of the fund’s 
investments).
100
  This compensation structure is known colloquially as “2 
and 20.”101 
The unusual taxation of the 2 and 20 structure has recently become the 
subject of intense political debate.
102
  “The general partners [of a venture 
capital fund] typically claim the 2% fee as compensation, so it’s subject to 
ordinary income and payroll taxes,” notes the Wall Street Journal.103  “But 
they often classify the 20% share of profits—where the big money can be—
as an investment producing a capital gain or loss.”104  The difference is 
important because the highest tax rate applied to capital gains is slightly 
more than half the highest rate applied to ordinary income.
105
 
But not all venture capital firms earn huge profits.  Indeed, many are 
not profitable at all.  The venture capital market is notoriously complex and 
challenging, and success is rare.
106
  The National Venture Capital 
Association cautions: “Approximately one-third of portfolio companies 
[held by venture capital funds] fail, so those that do succeed must do so in a 
big way.”107  Otherwise, the fund managers will run out of capital as 
investors move to other managers.  On the other hand, successful venture 
capital firms and other financial intermediaries continue to attract investors.  
Indeed, “[m]any recent . . . funds have capital exceeding $1 billion (and a 
few exceeding $10 billion).”108  The success of these firms traces in large 
part to the industry’s ability to attract the best and brightest with the 
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B.  Strategic Venture Capital and Recent Government Projects 
As the CIA grew in influence within the U.S. government, its staff did 
not miss the concurrent rising influence of the financial sector.  When the 
National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA, the financial sector 
contributed 2.3% to U.S. gross domestic product.
110
  By 2007 that figure 
had increased by almost four times to 8.1%.
111
  “In other words,” observed 
historian Niall Ferguson, “approximately $1 of every $13 paid to employees 
in the United States now went to people working in finance.”112  
Commenting on this trend, one CIA official concluded “the flow of capital 
and talent has irresistibly moved to the commercial sector, where the 
prospect of huge profits from initial public offerings and equity-based 
compensation has become the norm.”113 
While venture capital is primarily considered a profit-driven 
industry,
114
 its “unique link between finance and innovation”115 also 
positions it to function as a sort of incubator for R&D.  Indeed, for the past 
few decades, a handful of corporations have made strategic venture capital 
investments in promising start-ups as part of broader attempts to 
supplement internal R&D efforts.
116
  Under this model, generating profits 
often takes a back seat to fueling innovation.  Whereas the strictly financial 
model seeks to buy stakes in the start-ups that will generate the highest 
profits from large growth, the strategic model primarily seeks to buy stakes 
in start-ups that will generate relevant new technology.  Through the 
investment process, the strategic venture capitalist hopes to gain early 
access to cutting-edge technology. 
Although it is difficult to assess the overall success of strategic venture 
capital investments with respect to R&D, a 2000 study published by the 
prominent think tank RAND concluded “a dollar of venture capital appears 
to be about three times more potent in stimulating patenting than a dollar of 
traditional corporate R&D.”117  The study suggested “venture capital, even 
though it averaged less than 3% of corporate R&D from 1983 to 1992, is 
responsible for a much greater share—about 8%—of U.S. industrial 
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innovations in this decade.”118 
The U.S. federal government paid careful attention to the rising role 
played by venture capital in the context of R&D.
119
  Seeking to act as a 
catalyst for innovation, the government created the Advanced Technology 
Program (ATP) in 1990.
120
  From 1990 to 2007, ATP provided “research 
funding to universities and colleges, government-owned laboratories, and 
for-profit enterprises.”121  As a public-private partnership, ATP funded 
projects that promised commercial applications and broad economic 
benefits.
122
  Although not a venture capital firm itself, ATP sought to 
produce a “halo effect”123 with the investments it made in order to draw the 
attention of private-sector venture capital funds, thus encouraging the 
private-sector funds to invest. 
In 2007, the Technology Innovation Program
124
 (TIP) replaced the 
Advanced Technology Program.
125
  Although TIP is a continuation of what 
has been termed “public venture capital,”126 TIP broadens the scope of 
funding to include “high-risk, high-reward, transformative research, . . . 
targeted to key societal challenges that are not being addressed 
elsewhere.”127  TIP defines a societal challenge as “a problem or issue 
confronted by society that when not addressed could negatively affect the 
overall function and quality of life of the Nation and as such justifies 
government attention.”128  To address such challenges, TIP “works closely 
with the private sector to understand where private resources are not 
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available.”129  When private resources are not available to address a societal 
challenge, TIP may step in to provide funding. 
Reviews of ATP and TIP have been mixed, with some finding such 
programs successful
130
 and others finding them unsuccessful.
131
  Supporters 
often argue that funding entrepreneurial ventures “will transform depressed 
economic regions, generate innovation, and create jobs.”132  This notion, 
according to opponents, “may be politically appealing, but . . . is naïve.”133  
A 2005 study prepared for the Department of Homeland Security identifies 
the source of tension.  The report advises that while “[s]tructuring venture 
capital activity within the private sector is challenging enough,”134 the 
participation of the government poses even greater challenges, since 
“[f]ederal agencies do not normally run businesses, make commercial 
investments, or develop commercial products.”135  Beyond the practical 
challenges of the government participating in an industry as unfamiliar as 
venture capital, critics argue such programs cause “an erosion in political 
accountability, [which is] a crucial element in democratic governance.”136 
In 1999, amid the backdrop of this debate, the CIA took the concept of 
government-backed, strategic venture capital investing to a new level. 
IV.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CIA AND IN-Q-TEL 
Unlike TIP, which is a public-private partnership that functions more 
as a pool of government grant money than a venture capital fund, In-Q-Tel 
is arguably a true, independent venture capital firm.  This Part examines the 
In-Q-Tel model more closely. 
A.  What Is In-Q-Tel? 
Shortly after In-Q-Tel opened for business, an article in the Los 
Angeles Daily Journal described the partnership between the firm and the 
CIA as “an out-of-the-box marriage between the federal government and 
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Silicon Valley.”137  As the writer put it, “This is a tale of James Bond meets 
venture capitalist.”138  True, the CIA wanted to play up the mystique of 
James Bond—the “Q” in the firm’s name, placed between “Intel” 
(shorthand for “Intelligence”), refers to James Bond’s fictional inventor of 
high-tech spy gear and other gadgets.
139
  However, characterizing In-Q-Tel 
solely as a venture capital firm is somewhat inaccurate.  Indeed, In-Q-Tel 
has variously (and correctly) been called a “technology accelerator,”140 a 
“private nonprofit venture capital company,”141 as well as “the ‘venture 
capital arm’ of the CIA.”142  Reflecting its focus on R&D, In-Q-Tel refers to 
itself as a “strategic investment firm.”143 
But the best definition of In-Q-Tel’s business model is supplied by an 
independent report prepared by Business Executives for National Security 
(BENS), an organization that fosters an exchange of ideas between the 
private and public sectors.
144
  “In-Q-Tel has been mischaracterized as a 
private venture capital firm,” observes the 2001 report.145  “More 
precisely . . . In-Q-Tel is an evolving blend of various business, nonprofit, 
and government research and development (R&D) models.  It is most 
analogous to a corporate strategic venture capital entity—like those 
maintained by major technology firms.”146  The BENS report notes that, 
while profit is important, In-Q-Tel primarily “seeks enhanced innovation, 
earlier discovery of relevant technologies, and more direct information on 
market developments.”147 
Regardless of the label, the important point is that In-Q-Tel, legally 
independent of the CIA, makes equity investments in private-sector firms 
using government-supplied funds.  In the years prior to In-Q-Tel’s 
formation, many observers had called for the CIA and the broader 
intelligence community to do some “radical rethinking about its missions 
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and the approaches, methods and techniques employed in discharging 
them.”148  As the first government-sponsored venture capital firm, In-Q-Tel 
was certainly radical. 
One of the driving factors in this radical new structuring was the 
concern that it would be nearly impossible for traditional CIA staffers to 
bridge the gap between the culture of the CIA and the culture of Silicon 
Valley.  “We had to find a way to harness the brilliance of young innovators 
in the IT industry,” recalled George Tenet.149  The problem was that “[t]o 
them, we were their fathers: stiff, buttoned up, wearing suits.  They wanted 
nothing to do with us.  We needed to bridge that generation gap.”150 
In its first move to create a generation-bridging familiar face, the CIA 
decided to charter In-Q-Tel as an independent entity, since it would then be 
able “to operate in the market place on equal footing with its commercial 
peers and with the speed and agility that the IT world demands.”151  The 
government, reasoned the CIA, is generally too sluggish to attract the 
attention of many innovators.
152
 
Next, In-Q-Tel needed a CEO with credibility in Silicon Valley, where 
many of In-Q-Tel’s investments would be made.  Gilman Louie, a 
charismatic thirty-nine-year-old video game developer
153
 who had just sold 
his own company for millions,
154
 seemed to fit the bill.  Louie, according to 
the Washington Post, is “a genuine Silicon Valley entrepreneur, who started 
his first company in his mother’s garage in San Francisco when he was 
22.”155 
After assuming his position as CEO, Louie went to work bridging the 
generation gap.  He noted approvingly that, although In-Q-Tel and the CIA 
would be partners, In-Q-Tel would “not [be] tied to the CIA’s 
organizational style and structure.”156  Elaborating on this point, Louie 
commented: “Because In-Q-Tel is a private company, we will be able to 
work in Internet time and structure ourselves in a manner that will be 
familiar to many of the information technology companies we hope to 
attract as partners.”157 
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At the announcement of In-Q-Tel’s formation in September 1999, 
Louie formally assumed his role as spokesman for the new venture.  “In 
many ways,” he declared, “the needs of business and the CIA are quickly 
converging.”158  Accordingly, the CIA and In-Q-Tel would “look for ways 
to find answers to similar problems.”159  Louie concluded: “In-Q-Tel will 
work to be the bridge that will allow our brightest minds to work on some 
of our nation’s toughest problems to foster creativity.”160 
B.  How In-Q-Tel Works 
Critics of hybrid organizations such as In-Q-Tel “tend to consider the 
governmental and private sectors as being legally distinct, with relatively 
little overlap in behavioral norms.”161  Yet, this is the point of In-Q-Tel: the 
CIA recognizes the public and private sectors function very differently, 
particularly with respect to procurement.  Traditionally, if the CIA had a 
need for which private-sector assistance was required, the Agency would 
initiate a bidding process.
162
  The winning bidder would earn the contract 
and deliver the product.  The product would eventually become obsolete, at 
which time a new process would begin again.  With the creation of In-Q-
Tel, the CIA aimed to establish a more efficient procurement process.  A 
case study endorsed by In-Q-Tel
163
 states: “As its primary goal, In-Q-Tel 
[seeks] to provide the CIA with solutions that [will] be supported by a 
competitive marketplace, not government funding.”164  Thus, the objective 
is to foster procurement relationships that are continuous rather than 
transactional and to secure technology that will be updated according to the 
constantly developing needs of the commercial market rather than the 
intermittent needs of a single government agency. 
Of course, In-Q-Tel requires funding.  Whereas financial venture 
capital funds raise money by securing committed capital from passive 
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investment purposes of about $37 million
166
 as part of the CIA’s budget for 
the Directorate of Science and Technology.
167
  While this may seem an odd 
use of taxpayer dollars, it fits within the broad discretionary authority 
afforded to intelligence operations since 1775.
168
 
An office within the CIA, called the In-Q-Tel Interface Center (QIC), 
serves as the link between the CIA and In-Q-Tel.
169
  QIC communicates 
unclassified problem sets to In-Q-Tel,
170
 for which In-Q-Tel is then charged 
with combing the private sector for potential fits with the technologies 
being developed by promising start-ups.  Typically, In-Q-Tel makes twelve 
to fifteen investments per year.
171
  When In-Q-Tel finds a company that 
seems poised to deliver, it will usually invest between $500,000 and $3 
million, with about 15-20% of that figure going toward an equity position in 
the company and the remaining sum covering licensing agreements and 




Like other venture capital firms, In-Q-Tel typically assumes an 
advisory position on a portfolio company’s board of directors.173  From this 
vantage point, In-Q-Tel acts as a general advisor to the company.  The 
perceived benefit of being an investor in the company rather than simply a 
customer is that, if any changes are made to the company or its product(s), 
In-Q-Tel will promptly find out.  As one of In-Q-Tel’s senior directors put 
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it in 2004, “When you are [only] a customer, you are often the last to know 
anything is going wrong with the company.”174 
Ostensibly not-for-profit, any returns In-Q-Tel generates from its 
portfolio companies flow back to In-Q-Tel.
175
  Although In-Q-Tel does not 
regularly disclose the financial performance of its portfolio,
176
 Gilman 
Louie stated in late 2005 that the firm had managed a cumulative rate of 
return of 26% up to that period.
177
  When In-Q-Tel realizes a profit from the 
exit of a portfolio company, the board of directors may then re-allocate the 
funds to new projects.
178
  As for compensation, between 20 to 40% of an In-
Q-Tel employee’s salary is put into a mandatory fund; for every three 
dollars In-Q-Tel invests, one dollar from the employee fund is also 
invested.
179
  Overall, In-Q-Tel managers are compensated differently than 
managers of traditional venture capital funds (which use the 2 and 20 
structure described earlier in Part III.A), but they still have a direct stake in 
the companies in which In-Q-Tel invests. 
In terms of In-Q-Tel’s potential investments, a senior director 
explained: 
We are out there combing the woods, working with entrepreneurs all 
over the United States, and for that matter, even worldwide.  We get 
business plans in, and we continually evaluate new technologies in a 
variety of different areas, of which knowledge management tools are 




Since its founding, In-Q-Tel has invested in companies that develop or 
have developed a range of technologies, including portable power sources, 
tiny cameras, tracking devices, encryption software, and data analysis 
tools.
181
  Although Silicon Valley is the focal point of In-Q-Tel’s investing 
 
 174 Hugh McKellar, Inside In-Q-Tel: Exclusive Interview, KMWORLD (July 1, 2004), 
http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/News/News-Analysis/Inside-In-Q-Tel-exclusive-
interview-9563.aspx. 
 175 Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 490. 
 176 “In-Q-Tel is a rather secretive group.”  Kashmir Hill, How the C.I.A. Perfects its 
Social Media Monitoring Technologies, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2010, 10:22 AM), 
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 177 Jay Solomon, Investing in Intelligence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at A4, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB112649119163137691-
v3hOitqG_UmQt3vvwFp_B3wWrc4_20060912.html?mod=tff_main_tff_top. 
 178 Sarah Lacy, Meet the CIA’s Venture Capitalist, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (May 9, 2005), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-05-09/meet-the-cias-venture-capitalist. 
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 180 McKellar, supra note 174. 
 181 Hill, supra note 166; Alumni Portfolio Companies, IN-Q-TEL, 




activities, since 1999 the firm has invested in companies with operations 
throughout North America, Europe, and Asia.
182
 
George Tenet, under whose direction In-Q-Tel came to life, reflected 
in 2007 that “[t]he In-Q-Tel alliance has put the [CIA] back at the leading 
edge of technology, a frontier we never should have retreated from in the 
first place.”183  Whether or not this assertion is true, another question 
altogether is whether an independent venture capital firm is the best vehicle 
to accomplish such a mission. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The current In-Q-Tel model has been touted as a success.  In March 
2012, for example, David Petraeus, then Director of the CIA, declared that 
“our partnership with In-Q-Tel is essential to helping identify and deliver 
groundbreaking technologies with mission-critical applications to the CIA 
and to our partner agencies.”184  According to Petraeus, the private sector’s 
“ability to rapidly prototype new products and get them to market—
especially our market—is a skill that government simply cannot match.”185 
But might the potential risks of In-Q-Tel be greater than the benefits?  
The 2001 BENS report concludes the opposite: “In-Q-Tel’s potential 
advantage to the CIA outweighs the risk.”186  Yet, this study was performed 
with relatively minimal data—In-Q-Tel had existed for only two years at 
the time.  The study seems to endorse In-Q-Tel more as a novel experiment 
than a true success.  The study advises: “Except for required audits and 
oversight, In-Q-Tel should be allowed to complete its initial business cycle 
without additional reviews.  A full business case assessment should be 
required at the end of the charter agreement [in] July 2004.”187  But the CIA 
extended In-Q-Tel’s initial five-year charter without the recommended 
study, and since 2001 no independent study or panel has fully assessed In-
Q-Tel’s successes or reevaluated its potential risks.188  “In-Q-Tel remains an 
 
 182 See, e.g., Press Release, In-Q-Tel, Asankya Launches Company at Demo Conference 
(Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.iqt.org/press/2008/Asankya_01-28-08.html; Press Release, In-Q-
Tel, In-Q-Tel Signs Strategic Agreement with Endeca to Bring Power of Guided Navigation 
to Government Agencies (Oct. 7, 2009), https://iqt.org/press/2003/Endeca_10-07-03.html.  
 183 TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26. 
 184 David H. Petraeus, Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency,, Remarks by Director David 
H. Petraeus at In-Q-Tel CEO Summit (Mar. 1, 2012), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/in-q-
tel-summit-remarks.html. 
 185 Id. 
 186 BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at v. 
 187 Id. at vi. 
 188 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 seemed to garner support for In-Q-Tel; 
perhaps the War on Terror has caused Congress to leave In-Q-Tel alone for the time being.  
See Cortese, supra note 141, at BU1; Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 490. 
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experiment,” reported the Washington Post in 2005, “that even its most 
ardent backers say has yet to prove its full potential.”189  A follow-up study, 
similar to the BENS report, would help add some objectivity to the 
discussion.  Indeed, “little is publicly known about In-Q-Tel, or about how 
the CIA defines ‘success’.”190  A recent article in the Virginia Law Review 
concluded: “Given the scarcity of publicly available information, it is 
difficult to say anything definitive as to whether the enterprise is truly 
effective, let alone more effective than were it housed entirely within the 
spy agency.”191 
This Part proceeds by examining various issues associated with the 
effectiveness of the current In-Q-Tel model.  It then suggests an alternative 
model by which the CIA may maintain or increase the effectiveness of In-
Q-Tel while reducing potential risks. 
A.  Internal Issues: Staffing and Technology Integration 
1.  Staffing In-Q-Tel and QIC 
In-Q-Tel still faces many of the same practical issues that existed when 
it opened for business in 1999, including recruiting, hiring, and retaining 
talent.  For a potential candidate, In-Q-Tel has the advantage of what one 
commentator has described as the “sexy CIA-Silicon Valley 
combination”192—an angle played up by the CIA with firm’s reference to 
the character known as “Q” from the James Bond franchise.  But 
compensation might be another story.  “Bright young people . . . go to 
Silicon Valley and get a whole load of stock options,” observed Norman 
Augustine, the former CEO of Lockheed Martin who was recruited by the 
CIA to help form In-Q-Tel.
193
  Augustine also noted: “The CIA doesn’t give 
stock options.”194 
In fact, In-Q-Tel appears to pay
195
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but significantly less than many leading venture capital firms.  The most 
recently available public filings show that, for 2010, In-Q-Tel’s CEO 
earned total compensation (including bonuses) of $965,023.
197
  The firm’s 
managing partner earned slightly less: $870,094.
198
  Compensation dropped 
considerably, however, for In-Q-Tel’s chief financial officer, who earned 
$473,447.
199
  On the other hand, a “typical managing partner” at a 
successful venture capital firm in Silicon Valley might command between 
$1 million to $5 million annually before receiving a bonus, according to a 
veteran of that market.
200
  Notably, while In-Q-Tel employees are 
compensated in part with equity holdings in the firm’s portfolio 
companies,
201
 In-Q-Tel’s equity investments are relatively small.202  Thus, 
In-Q-Tel employees stand to earn less in the aggregate from a successful 




With this in mind, why would an ideal candidate choose to join In-Q-
Tel as opposed to a leading venture capital firm?  Perhaps the candidate 
might have the opportunity to participate at a higher level earlier at In-Q-
Tel, or perhaps the candidate would prefer In-Q-Tel out of a sense of 
national service.  Certainly, individuals capable of commanding extremely 
high compensation in the private sector have opted instead for government 
service.  One prominent example is Robert S. McNamara, who left his job 
as president of Ford Motor Company to serve as Secretary of Defense under 
 
program and other employee benefits are comparable to the high-tech and other appropriate 
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President John F. Kennedy.
204
 
In-Q-Tel seems to have recruited the first group of employees on the 
CIA-Silicon Valley combination, plus a sense of national service.
205
  
Augustine, the founding chairman from Lockheed Martin, and Louie, the 
founding CEO who had been a successful entrepreneur, were independently 
wealthy when they signed up.  But Louie, having served as CEO since the 
formation of In-Q-Tel in 1999, left in January 2006 to form a new venture 
capital firm “to invest in early-stage technology companies.”206  While 
Louie’s work thus remains much the same, one can only speculate his 
compensation has increased.  After Louie’s departure, In-Q-Tel seemed to 
have trouble finding a successor.  In-Q-Tel initially recruited Amit Yoran to 
serve as CEO, but Yoran’s tenure lasted only four months.207  Scott Yancey 
served as interim CEO until Christopher Darby, who had previously been 
with Intel, took over as CEO in September 2006.
208




As the initial glamour of the CIA-Silicon Valley combination begins to 
wane, In-Q-Tel’s sub-market compensation,210 relative to other venture 
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 may reduce the overall talent In-Q-Tel is able to acquire.  
As Louie himself put it, “The most important thing [for In-Q-Tel] is the 
technology return.  Of secondary importance is the financial return.”212  
Even if financial return were the most important thing for In-Q-Tel, the firm 
would not be able to compete on the same footing as many other venture 
capital firms.  Often, the funds managed by leading venture capital firms 
exceed $100 million of committed capital,
213
 and many exceed $1 billion.
214
  
In-Q-Tel, on the other hand, operates with far less capital.  Investment 
opportunities and aggregate returns are therefore restrained, possibly 
reducing the interest levels of potential employees. 
2.  Technology Integration at the CIA 
Beyond the practical issues surrounding the operation of In-Q-Tel 
itself, further issues exist with respect to the successful integration of 
technologies generated by In-Q-Tel’s portfolio companies.  The conclusion 
of the 2001 BENS report is illustrative.  The CIA’s Director, it noted, “must 
make the CIA leadership accountable for encouraging and nurturing a 
cultural change that accepts solutions from the ‘outside world’.”215  
Apparently, this had been a struggle.  But acceptance of solutions delivered 
by In-Q-Tel is not the only problem.  QIC—the CIA department charged 
with serving as the liaison between In-Q-Tel and the CIA—is an 
administrative layer through which In-Q-Tel’s technologies must move to 
reach the larger CIA.
216
  The right staffing of QIC is therefore critical to the 
ultimate success of In-Q-Tel’s investments.217  Unfortunately, the initial 
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CIA employees charged with running QIC apparently viewed the 
assignment as less than “career enhancing.”218  Attracting the right people 
to a department with such a reputation would, of course, be difficult. 
Whether the CIA resolved the staffing issues with QIC since the 2001 
BENS report suggested the problem is unclear.
219
  Apparently the CIA 
attempted to address the problem in 2000, when it sent the original group of 
QIC staff on a team-building retreat.  The Washington Post reported, rather 
dryly: The members of QIC “built rope bridges and hauled each other over 
rivers.  At night, to loosen things up, they all wore Hawaiian shirts.”220  But 
a corporate-style team-building retreat might be an ill-suited remedy.  
Perhaps the awkward, unaddressed issue is that QIC is staffed by CIA 
employees who are paid significantly less than their counterparts at In-Q-
Tel—this disparity may negatively affect cooperation between QIC and In-
Q-Tel. 
While the image of CIA employees wearing Hawaiian shirts on a 
team-building retreat may be somewhat humorous, this speaks to another, 
basic point: the CIA is not a for-profit organization.  Subjecting CIA 
employees to programs inspired by corporate America may well fail.  
Indeed, during his tenure as Director, George Tenet observed the CIA was 
“an organization that seemed to pride itself on its unbusinesslike 
methods.”221  Concerned with this attitude, Tenet hired a former executive 
from an investment bank to bring “business savvy” to the CIA.222  “I was no 
Jack Welch and I knew it,” remarked Tenet, referring to the well-known 
former Chairman and CEO of General Electric.
223
  The comment of a 
former CIA employee, who in fact supported the In-Q-Tel experiment, is 
illustrative.  “The CIA’s mission was intelligence collection and analysis,” 
he wrote, “not IT innovation.”224  Of course, innovations delivered by In-Q-
Tel’s portfolio companies will never assist the CIA with its mission if QIC 
does not function properly and efficiently. 
B.  External Issues: International Security and Foreign Entanglements 
As the U.S. government’s principal spy agency, the CIA has long been 
exposed to issues of public international law.  Most recently, the CIA’s use 
of unmanned drones in targeted killings has implicated questions of 
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In-Q-Tel, on the other hand, takes the CIA beyond public international 
law.  In-Q-Tel’s investments in private-sector firms expose In-Q-Tel, and 
vicariously the CIA, to issues arising from contract disputes, patent rights, 
and securities laws.
226
  Indeed, in a 2005 article, BusinessWeek noted In-Q-
Tel “is always walking a fine line between the public and private sector.”227  
For example, in 2006 In-Q-Tel invested in a data management firm whose 
operations included Chicago, Toronto, London, and Sydney.
228
  Canadian 
hospitals used the firm’s software to track patients’ medical records.  
Prompted by concern the CIA may somehow have obtained access to these 
records, the provincial government in Ontario investigated the In-Q-Tel 
investment.
229
  “Canadians can rest easy,” remarked the Washington Post at 
the conclusion of the investigation, “[t]he CIA is not using its venture 
capital arm to snoop into the medical records of our northern neighbors.”230 
Future exchanges may not end so amicably.  What would happen, for 
instance, if the company were to have been supplying records-tracking 
software to clients in China?  It is unclear that disputes or investigations 
would be contained with In-Q-Tel alone.  Notably, while In-Q-Tel is 
chartered as a corporation independent from the government, QIC occupies 
an observer role on the In-Q-Tel board of directors
231
 and thereby exerts 
control over the firm.  Indeed, before investing in a target company, In-Q-
Tel “considers [QIC’s] insight.”232  Further, In-Q-Tel’s primary client and 
source of funds is the CIA.
233
  It is thus entirely possible that the CIA and 
larger U.S. federal government would be approached by concerned foreign 
governments or private-sector companies with respect to investment 
decisions made by In-Q-Tel.  This could cause serious foreign relations 
issues with nations that may have good reason to believe the CIA is using 
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In-Q-Tel as a platform for espionage rather than R&D. 
Recent political angling in South Korea further highlights this point.  
In February 2012, a South Korean newspaper revealed that “Kim Jeong-
hun, nominee for Minister of Future Creation and Science, sat on an 
advisory committee for the US Central Intelligence Agency in 2009.”234  
The article pointed out that “[t]he news comes on the heels of revelations 
that Kim also served as a director for In-Q-Tel, a company established by 
the CIA in 1999.”235  This information prompted one South Korean 
politician to declare that President-elect Park Geun-hye “needs to explain 
why she nominated [Kim] as Minister of Future Creation and Science while 
knowing his background.”236  As the newspaper explained, “The concern is 
what position Kim, who has expressed strongly patriotic sentiments toward 
the [United States], might take in the event of a conflict between that 
country’s interests and South Korea’s if he serves as a Cabinet minister.”237 
Another scenario to consider is the possibility of In-Q-Tel being 
targeted for purposes of industrial espionage.  If a foreign firm were to 
succeed in stealing trade secrets from In-Q-Tel or one of its portfolio 
companies, to what extent would the CIA or larger federal government 
become involved?  As one CIA official observed: “The open affiliation 
between the CIA and In-Q-Tel undoubtedly attract[s] the interests of 
foreign persons, some with questionable motives.”238  However, the CIA 
ultimately determined “the risks are manageable and, in many ways, are 
similar to those faced by any high-tech company trying to protect its 
[intellectual property] and trade secrets.”239  Commenting around the time 
of In-Q-Tel’s formation, the CIA official emphasized: “In-Q-Tel and the 
Agency will be working closely to ensure [In-Q-Tel] operates with a high 
degree of security awareness and support.”240 
While on the one hand the increasing interconnectedness of the 
world
241
 has blurred the distinction between public and private international 
law, the entry of the U.S. government via the CIA and In-Q-Tel into the 
world of venture capital marks a significant—perhaps unprecedented—
mixing of the public and private sectors.  When In-Q-Tel takes an equity 
stake in a company with operations outside the United States, should 
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foreign governments be concerned about the CIA’s role in the exchange?  
The answer is unclear, but certainly this issue merits greater attention than it 
has received thus far. 
C.  Recommendations 
Structuring venture capital activity within the private sector is 
challenging enough; it becomes a different matter altogether when the 
government is involved.  A 2002 article by Harvard professor Josh Lerner 
asked whether government involvement with venture capital may ever be 
successful.  His somewhat optimistic conclusion: “Certainly, this possibility 
is not implausible.”242  On the other hand, Stanford professor Ronald Gilson 
concluded such collaboration is ultimately fruitless.  “The U.S. venture 
capital market developed organically,” argued Gilson, “largely without 
government assistance and certainly without government design.”243  At the 
very least, another independent report on In-Q-Tel’s activities would help 
shed light on some of the issues addressed above.  As discussed, the follow-
up report recommended by BENS in 2001 was never made. 
Beyond a follow-up report, the CIA should restructure the In-Q-Tel 
model to limit its exposure to private sector disputes.  Gilman Louie 
correctly surmised that “[i]f we want a CIA that performs better, we’ll need 
to take more risks—and give our government the freedom to fail.”244  But 
the potential for CIA involvement in major disputes arising from In-Q-Tel’s 
investments is a failure that should be deemed an unnecessary risk. 
As an alternative to the current model, In-Q-Tel should discontinue 
making equity investments
245
 and instead use its funds solely to cover 
licensing agreements and to pay for contracts to develop technology to fit 
the specific needs of the CIA.  Such activity covers the majority of what In-
Q-Tel already does, and cutting out the equity investments would 
drastically reduce the CIA’s exposure to private-sector disputes.  While it 
may be true that “the best software around is more likely to be developed in 
Silicon Valley than in the Pentagon,”246 such a modified arrangement would 
retain the CIA-Silicon Valley relationship but with a reduced level of risk. 
Further, In-Q-Tel’s equity investing—the riskiest component of the 
current model—is also the firm’s least effective service to portfolio 
companies.  A recent survey of thirty-four of In-Q-Tel’s portfolio 
companies revealed that “[o]nly roughly a third of surveyed In-Q-Tel 
companies indicated that the equity investment was highly or extremely 
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important for developing their technology.”247  The survey results showed 
that: 
[M]ore than half of the companies found equity investments to be the 
least valuable asset of their interactions with In-Q-Tel.  Furthermore, 
59 percent of companies reported that they were very likely to have 
received sufficient funding for their business ventures without any 
In-Q-Tel investment.  Given that In-Q-Tel is not focused on financial 
gains, these results question whether equity investments are a crucial 
part of the In-Q-Tel process.  Indeed, some interviewed companies 
observed that In-Q-Tel seemed insistent on an equity investment . . . 
even if the company was not particularly interested in it.
248
 
In addition to discontinuing In-Q-Tel’s equity investing activities, the 
CIA should remove QIC from the observer seat on In-Q-Tel’s board.  
Granting greater autonomy to In-Q-Tel will create further distance between 
the firm and the CIA, which may reduce the suspicions of foreign 
governments and companies.  Moreover, since the CIA employees of QIC 
appear to have no background or expertise with the “extremely 
challenging”249 activity of venture capital investing (or contracting with 
private companies for the acquisition of various technologies), it is not clear 
that their involvement at this level with In-Q-Tel is necessary. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The CIA should be congratulated for spearheading a bold and 
innovative new approach to its mission, but In-Q-Tel has much to prove 
before it may be deemed a success.  While collaboration between the R&D 
efforts of the public and private sectors is indeed vital and should be 
encouraged, the risks of In-Q-Tel’s government-sponsored equity 
investments in private companies outweigh the benefits.  Gilman Louie got 
it right when he said “[t]he CIA and the rest of the government need to 
catch the entrepreneurial, risk-taking spirit that’s driving the Silicon Valley 
technology revolution.”250  It is not clear, however, such a spirit should be 
embodied in a government-sponsored venture capital firm.
251
  Accordingly, 
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the recommendations of this Comment suggest a framework by which In-




whereas [government venture capital] programs are primarily driven by strategic concerns.”  
Mara, supra note 6, at 11. 
